By Craig A. Snyder
This article brings jointly quite a number specially-commissioned chapters to supply an available advent to defense stories within the twenty first century. Thethird version has been improved to hide non-military demanding situations to defense, and comprises new studying aids.
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Extra info for Contemporary Security and Strategy
His main conclusion was that 'the strength of the enemy ... is dependent upon stability or "equilibrium" of control, morale and supply'. He said: 'in all the decisive campaigns, the dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow. ' He crystallised the lessons of the history of war into two simple maxims: one negative, one positive. 'The first is that ... ' To do so is like knowingly hitting one's head against the wall.
In his search for the scientific principles underlying war, Jomini initially underestimated or ignored the qualities of personal leadership that enabled Napoleon and many others to snatch victory out of disaster. Half acknowledging this - perhaps after reading Clausewitz's On War - Jomini later emphasised that 'war is a great drama, in which a thousand physical or moral causes operate . . and which cannot be reduced to mathematical calculations.... ' 38 Thus, Jomini ended up saying exactly what Clausewitz had already said about the uncertain nature of war.
This clear distinction between strategy and tactics was one of the things that raised Mahan above the level of earlier writers. In Mahan's view, navies are better instruments of national policy than are armies. Why? Because 'the influence of a navy could be felt where the national armies cannot go'. 83 36 The Evolution of Strategic Thought What are the elements of sea power? Extrapolating from the seventeenthand eighteenth-century English history, Mahan postulated six 'general conditions affecting sea power' that he saw as universal and timeless in character: (1) the geographical location of a country; (2) its physical conformation; (3) the extent of its territory; (4) the size of its population; (5) the national character; and (6) the character and policy of the government.